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ART. VIII. — NOMINATING CONVENTIONS.

IN the introductory chapter to his treatise on Liberty Mr. Mill points out the fact, that, in a government “of all by all,” “the ‘people’ who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised, and the self-government spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.” In fact, self-government means the absolute power of the many over the few. Who are the many? In our own country the negroes and “poor white trash” of the South, the mass of foreign emigrants, “the dangerous classes” in our cities, the unskilled laborers, the ignorant generally, who represent the physical force of the community. The many include much that is morally good, much also of depravity and vice caused by the weakness and temptations of ignorance and poverty. And who are the few? In a country like ours, which offers such a boundless field and such ample rewards to intelligent industry, they are a large class, though unable to cope in numbers with the former. They are the men of letters and science and high culture; they are the men of fortune and leisure and refined manners and elegant tastes; they are the owners of property, from the millionaire down to him whose modest means, though not included in the income tax, are enough to give him the feeling of independence and self-respect which property confers, — a “stake in the hedge” that protects the rights of all. The few are the men of business and enterprise who direct the commerce, the finance, the manufactures, and agriculture of the country from the great capitalist down to the small trader, from the farmer who cultivates and improves a thousand acres to the cottager with ten. They are the men whose *thought* creates the wealth of the country, who lay the railroad track through the wilderness, who build and adorn cities, who found libraries and colleges, churches and charities, who encourage all the arts by which civilized is distinguished from rude and barren life.

These men are out-voted. They pay the taxes which are imposed by the majority, so that the maxim that taxation

should be founded on representation is virtually violated. They have, no doubt, commanding influence over those questions about which educated and intelligent men differ in opinion, because they only think about such questions at all, and because the press must represent their views or represent nothing, and must address them or address nobody. But over the primary, essential principles upon which all rights and all security depend, and about which enlightened men do not differ, they have little direct power. They are the minority, the governed, and all that they possess is held by sufferance and permission, and not by right and authority.

Heretofore, however, the majority has not proved an unjust or oppressive master. Traditionary habits of thought have so far prevailed that rights have been, if not universally, so generally secure, that confidence in the supremacy of order and law has been maintained, and has caused such a rapid and flourishing growth of prosperity throughout our country, that we ourselves, in common with all the world, behold it with wonder. The war, however, and the events growing out of it, and the chaos of opinion and passion now surging around us, have made many more than the philosophic few thoughtful and alarmed. A feeling of distrust in the future is pervading society. Many indications prove that the idea is rapidly gaining ground that political power is in the wrong place, and that universal suffrage threatens the country with terrible calamities.

With this idea is connected the question, How is power to be put in the right place? A fearful question, for on it hang the issues of life and death. How can power be taken out of the hands of the many? Not by votes, for they have the votes. Not by force, for they have the force. Can no answer be given to this question by our age of culture and civilization? Can it point only to the experience of the past, which tells us that power in the wrong place, like pent-up steam, bursts its way out with explosive violence, scattering around it wounds and death, though when well managed, like steam it gives motion to the machinery of industry and trade. It seems so, for no answer has been given. The only reply has been: "No, there is no hope. Political power, once granted, cannot be withdrawn, without a struggle fatal to liberty. The mere proposal would

destroy any public man or party by whom it was made. Therefore it never will be made. But may not the power, even of the multitude, be restrained and guided? That is the only question worth discussing, for all reasoning on the subject of government is conditioned by the possible. If this, too, be impossible, then we must prepare our minds to meet, as best we can, the perils of the future."

Out of this conviction have grown various plans to regulate the elective franchise: such as Mr. Hare's, of personal representation; and plural voting, by which persons of the superior classes have each more than one vote; and cumulative voting, by which all the votes that would otherwise be distributed among several candidates may be given to one;—schemes, all of them, whose purpose is to give representation to a minority, and thus curb the power of the many over the few.

These plans have their value. They should be carefully considered, as they may correct or mitigate the evils of our system. But they fail to provide for one thing which is necessary to the successful working of any plan, and that is, the nomination of fit persons for office.

It being impossible for the people themselves to administer their power, they must delegate it to agents and representatives. As the exercise of power over the interests of a great and civilized nation requires a degree of knowledge and ability superior to that of the average, men above the average must be chosen, or public affairs, and, as a consequence, private affairs too, would fall into hopeless ruin and confusion. A government of the ignorant, elected by the ignorant, would be an impossibility, except among savage tribes, and even they select for chiefs and rulers their ablest and strongest men. It follows, therefore, that, even under our system, which is the government of the few by the many, the trustees of power, those who for a time apply it to persons and things, and regulate both private and national interests, must be chosen from the enlightened few and not from the ignorant many.

They have been for the most part so chosen heretofore, and are so now, though less frequently than formerly. If the executive offices, the legislature, and the judiciary were filled by workingmen unable to read and write, or, possessing so

much knowledge, wholly ignorant of law and the nature of government and of the principles that control finance and commerce and industry, — men whose hands were familiar with the hod and the wheelbarrow, the anvil and the plough, and whose talk was only of bullocks, — it is clear that the life of such a government would soon cease amid the wrecks which it had created. Yet it would be a government of the ignorant many, by representatives chosen from the many. Instances of daily occurrence show that it is the sort of government towards which ours is tending. The executive office shows it; the Congressional debates show it; and Congress itself, where sit at this moment gamblers and pugilists, drunkards and criminals and men wholly destitute of every sort of knowledge proper for the place. This is the tendency, notwithstanding the high average of intelligence and practical ability, and, in some instances, the eminent talents, which Congress still displays. It is a tendency whose movement is likely to be hastened by growing influences. Means to resist it are therefore a pressing want of the time.

The meaning of the phrase “the power of the people” is not easily defined. Theoretically, they are said to be sovereign over themselves; but this can be true only of a majority, and it is another way of saying that one portion has supreme power over another portion, unless all should agree. But how can this sovereignty be exerted? The people cannot make laws or execute them, cannot administer justice, cannot make war or impose taxes, or do any of the thousand things which yet must be done for their safety and welfare. They are obliged to choose or permit somebody to do these things for them, — in other words, to govern them. This somebody, whether composed of one or many, whether chosen or accepted or endured for a longer or shorter time, is the government to whom they have given or yielded their power. So that, as power which cannot be exerted does not exist, it is a fallacy to say that the people govern themselves, and the province of the government has been well described to be, to do for the people what they cannot do for themselves. But, it is said, the people when free govern themselves by their representatives, and in the power of choosing these consists their sovereignty. But can

they make this choice ? On this question hinges the problem of democratic government. If they cannot, any more than they can make and execute laws, then somebody must do it for them. We know, in fact, that somebody does do it for them, and, it is easy to show, because they cannot do it for themselves.

Each man in the community cannot separately make a choice, and propose it to all the others. This would be impossible, except in a very small number of people, such as a boat's crew or a ship's company. If a large number collected together, there would at once arise a necessity for organization and leaders, and they would offer the candidate, who, if accepted, would be really the choice of these leaders. If this assembly did not include the whole number of voters, then those not present would be obliged to vote for the persons thus selected, or not vote at all, so that the leaders would choose for them also. Should any number of the people be dissatisfied with the choice thus made, and wish to oppose it, they must meet and organize in the same way, and their leaders must select a candidate, and one of the two thus nominated must be elected ; but he will in reality be elected, not by the many who voted for him, but by the few who offered him to be voted for. It is true that if each of the voters, or a very large proportion of them, did, after examination, approve the choice thus made, the electors might be said themselves to select their representatives, though even then the initiatory step, which is the important one, would be made by the few, perhaps by one only, for there probably would be several candidates eager for the place, either of whom, if presented to the voters, would be chosen. The one chosen, therefore, would obviously have great influence over these leaders, might indeed by intimidation or promise of reward beforehand obtain their decision in his favor.

We see, therefore, that, even on a small scale, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the people, however respectable they may be, to choose their representatives, and that the tendency of power is always to concentrate itself in a few hands. If the electors or a majority of them be of a low order, morally and intellectually, they blindly deliver themselves up to men who become their leaders by flattering their passions and by

promising success to their wild hopes and dangerous schemes. Such men present as candidates others like themselves. Thus the rule of the many is always liable to become the reign of ignorance and corruption.

The same process is necessary whether on a large or a small scale, though the larger the number of electors the more completely do they fall into the hands of a few, and the less chance is there of their exerting any control over the choice of their representatives. In a large and populous region, covered with cities and villages and factories, where elections are frequent and the offices to be filled numerous, any intelligent selection of candidates by the people becomes impossible. The people are necessarily divided into parties, representing opposite opinions on public affairs and conflicting interests. These parties are composed of large masses of men, who become excited by contest, heated often by violent and reckless passion, and, in proportion to their zeal or rage, eager for victory. For effective action, concert, method, rules, plans, and persons appointed to make those plans and execute them, are essential conditions. Thence the formation, management, and "drill" of parties; thence the growth of a body of men, active, clever, energetic, learned in the statistics of votes, experts in popular arts, skilful to touch the chords of popular passions, and able to set in motion and work the varied machinery which governs an election.

These men form a disciplined corps of various ranks and duties, from the holders or expectants of high office down to the lowest underling who does the dirty work. They do not work for nothing, high or low, but play for a large stake. To many of them that stake is the welfare of the country, which they think dependent on the opinions they support, the triumph of truth and justice and sound doctrine, the gratification of an honorable ambition which seeks distinction in a fair field for intellectual effort and display. But the stake includes some hundred of millions of dollars annually, to be disbursed by the winning party, and to this fund the lower ranks of these managers look for a less noble reward. Such a body of men is the inevitable growth of a representative government. Parties must exist, and without managers parties cannot be organized and

moved, any more than an army without officers can be disciplined and brought into action. Party managers, therefore, are a necessity: They form a voluntary society, a secret league scattered everywhere throughout the country, united by a common purpose, exercising immense power without legal duties or responsibility, paid or expecting pay from the public treasury, assuming no authority, distinguished by no badge or title, and only vaguely known by the appropriate name given to them by the popular voice of "trading politicians." These are the men who nominate candidates, and their nomination is the real election.

They cannot do this openly themselves, for that would be to avow themselves members of a distinct profession, and to assume power, whereas the secret of their power lies in their claiming none, and in their denial of membership in any society clothed with power. The people must apparently be free to choose their representatives. The slightest suspicion of any interference with that privilege would be fatal to those who made it. But it is impossible for the people to choose candidates for the place of representative; they can only vote for those chosen by somebody else. Now, the success of an election depends often on the character of the candidates offered to the people, and those elected control the administration of the government, control the patronage, control the treasury. Victory at the elections being the sole object of parties, or rather the means by which parties obtain their objects, unless the managers can govern the elections they are of no use. They can do nothing for their party or for themselves. As a party can only vote for candidates selected by somebody else, the task of selecting them belongs necessarily to the leaders of a party.

Out of this necessity and the conditions annexed to it have grown up an institution known to our practice by the name of Nominating Conventions. They were invented to do what the people cannot do for themselves, but which must be done,—select candidates to be voted for by the people. To confer a trust so important on persons not chosen by the people would violate the ruling principle of popular sovereignty. The conventions, therefore, are elected by each party, at what are called primary meetings. But here another inexorable condition

reveals itself. A political party must be an organized body with rules of action and with leaders, otherwise it is a mere powerless, unconnected crowd. The leaders therefore must govern, more especially in the vital work of choosing representatives of the party. Thence it has become a maxim that every one must vote for the "regularly nominated candidates" of the party. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that, somehow or other, the constituted authorities of the party must control these primary elections.

Because it is necessary, they do control them. The great mass of the party, anxious for the success of its principles and policy, leave the direction of its forces to those who have become its managers, for thus only can success be attained. They do not go to the primary meetings. They are too busy. Regular elections are so numerous that they have become burdensome. It is enough that they vote at these. Besides, why should they go? To gain a knowledge of the merits of the candidates for the many officers now elected by the people would be a very difficult undertaking, requiring much time and labor,—more than they can give, without injury to their private business. Moreover, it would be to interfere with the regular management of the party and endanger its success. Practically, they vote for any one nominated, without inquiry. The control of the primary elections thus falls inevitably into the hands, not of the more respectable leaders of the party, those who determine its general policy, but of the working managers, an inferior class. They arrange beforehand who shall be members of the convention, they preside at the meeting and bring together a crowd of voters, generally a small one, upon whose obedience they can depend. By what arts these meetings are sometimes managed is told in the following extract from the "*Nation*" of November 22, 1866, one of the ablest and most influential journals in the country:—

"The machinery by which the selection of candidates is usually arranged in the Northern States consists of primary elections; that is, of elections held within the ranks of each party, and managed without any control on the part of the State. At these elections delegates are chosen to conventions, which nominate candidates on each side, who are thenceforth called 'regular.'

“The nature and working of these primary elections are, therefore, matters of deep interest to every thoughtful and patriotic citizen. No one who studies politics at all should fail to study the operation of this branch of political machinery.

“We do not pretend to know much about primary elections in the rural districts, or even in other cities than New York and Brooklyn ; but, judging from what we hear, and from the visible fruits of the system in the country at large, we should say that a picture drawn from the reality in New York would be recognized by politicians in nearly all other cities, and even in many country villages, as not unlike scenes familiar to them.

“The Democratic party retains the primary election in all its pristine glory, such as it was fifteen years ago in both the great parties of the day. The election is held in the lowest groggery of the ward. A mob of vagabonds surround the door, and, well supplied with liquor by the candidates, vote just as many times each as they can crowd their way to and from the poll during the time fixed for the election. Thus a collection of two or three hundred patriots will easily cast six or eight hundred votes. The inspectors, if experienced in their business, never object to a vote. Why should they ? Why irritate a true Democrat, bent upon exercising his franchise three or four times over, when a milder remedy may be found ? A clever inspector knows better. When he comes to count the votes, his sleeve is filled with ballots of the right sort, and after emptying these upon the table, he adroitly sweeps a few score of obnoxious ballots into his lap. As the three inspectors are almost invariably united in interest, it is obvious that they can do effective work in this way. But a yet neater method has been in use for some years at a number of polls. The inspectors shut out the unwashed and tipsy crowd of voters, sit for an hour or two over their whiskey and cigars, and, without going through the ridiculous form of counting the votes, return the numbers in such manner as seems to them most for the good of the party, and best calculated to replenish their purses.”

It is not asserted that this picture is universally true, but practices similar to those described are so general that they account for the number of inferior men elected to fill important offices, and for the widespread corruption that is eating like a canker into every branch of our government, national and State. Bribery has become so common a practice, that it is the rule, honesty the exception. The air is thick with it.

Fraud penetrates into every detail of administration, even to the management of public charities and schools. The legislatures of our large cities are described constantly in the daily press as bands of thieves living on the plunder of the public. The "Nation" of November 28, 1867, thus speaks of the government of New York:—

"We firmly believe that the prolongation of the existing system of government in New York does more in two years to make men deaf to the claims of justice, indifferent to suffering, to corruption, and to villany, than ten years of lecturing and preaching and article-writing would remove."

Such is the crop which grows on the soil of popular ignorance invested with power. But whether the masses be enlightened or ignorant, although the character of their government will be different, there are, if our reasoning be correct, two natural laws by which a representative government is controlled: one of these is, that the people cannot choose their representatives; the other is, that the choice will inevitably be made by the managers of the successful party. These managers are thus the real electors and govern the country, so far as it can be governed or influenced by the character of the men selected to administer its political power. It is useless to resist these laws. If we seek a remedy for the alarming evils growing out of their action, we must recognize and obey them, for it is only by obedience that we can use them for our purpose.

Let us accept, then, the truth that the nomination of a candidate is the real election, and that the persons who make the nomination will always be chosen by party leaders. This at once invests the office of nominator with deep interest. It is an office of great power and importance. Is it not strange that it is one unknown to the law and scarcely thought of by the people, who imagine that it is by *their* votes that their representatives are chosen, simply because they do vote at an election? One would think that the law would surround such a power by all sorts of checks and guards to secure its wise and honest administration; would take care to impose on those who fill the office legal duties and responsibilities, and to insure their appointment in some open and legal manner, so

that at least their names might be known to the public. According to the present practice, no one, except the small number of the initiated, knows who they are or who those are by whom they are selected. The general belief is that neither the choosers nor the chosen are people of high character; that often they are of very low character, — demagogues, rowdies, gamblers, and keepers of grog-shops. The debates of these important societies or clubs are secret, but the results of their proceedings are known in the choice of candidates, often of such infamous character that honest men refuse to vote for them, although by refusing they withdraw their support from measures and principles which they deem of vital importance to the country.

It is not surprising that honorable and cultivated men avoid public life when they must undergo the ordeal of a nomination by such a body. It is no wonder that corruption prevails so generally in all the departments of our government. The wonder is that, under such a system, any healthy life is left in the government at all, and that there are still in office enough honest men to prevent it from falling into hopeless confusion and ruin. The evil has reached such a monstrous growth that every one sees it, dreads it, and while some, in the apathy of despair, yield to it as a fate, others are inquiring for a remedy. How can we curb and regulate, if we cannot get rid of, this power that has thus quietly and gradually grown to such gigantic bulk that it rules the country and threatens to destroy it?

The national Constitution affords us some light in attempting to answer this question. In the formation of all branches of the government except the House of Representatives, it has recognized the wisdom of the rule that the trustees of political power should be the chosen of the chosen. That they should be removed by one step at least from direct action of popular opinion, so liable to be inflamed by passion and to be controlled by demagogues. It may be assumed that the people, unless unfit for free government, will select persons above the average in capacity and virtue, and that these, acting under the responsibility of an important duty, if appointed to choose persons fit for a high trust, will prefer men better than

themselves. Thus Senators in Congress are chosen by the legislatures of the States. The judges of the Federal courts are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ; and the President is chosen by electors, appointed by each State, " in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct." It was not intended by the framers that the President should be chosen by the people. The electors were to make the choice, and even they were not necessarily to be elected by the people. This intention was immediately defeated, and the result has proved the wisdom of the Constitution. All these important offices were meant to be filled by the chosen of the chosen, and the choosers were persons appointed by the law for the purpose.

To the application of this rule De Tocqueville ascribes the superiority of the Senate over the House.

" On entering the House of Representatives," he says, " one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly. The eye frequently does not discover a man of celebrity within its walls. Its members are almost all obscure individuals whose names present no association to the mind ; they are mostly village attorneys, men in trade, or even persons belonging to the lower classes of society. In a country where education is very general, it is said that the Representatives of the people do not always know how to write correctly. At a few yards' distance from this spot is the door of the Senate, which contains within a small space a large proportion of the celebrated men of America. [He was writing thirty years ago.] Scarcely an individual is to be perceived in it who does not recall the idea of an active and illustrious career.

" The Senate is composed of eloquent advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates and statesmen of note, whose language would at all times do honor to the most remarkable parliamentary debates in Europe. . . . Why is the former body remarkable for its vulgarity and its poverty of talent, whilst the latter seems to enjoy a monopoly of intelligence and sound judgment ? . . . The only reason that seems to me adequately to account for it is, that the House of Representatives is elected by the populace directly, and that the Senate is elected by elected bodies. . . . This transmission of popular authority through an assembly of chosen men operates an important change in it by refining its discretion and improving the forms it adopts. Men who are chosen in this manner accurately represent the majority of the nation that governs them ; but they represent the elevated thoughts which are

current in the community, the generous propensities which prompt its nobler action, rather than the petty passions which disturb or the vices which disgrace it."

And he adds, in what events are proving to have been a prophetic spirit,—

"The time may be already anticipated at which the American Republics will be obliged to introduce the plan of election by an elected body more frequently into their system of representation, or they will incur no small risk of perishing miserably amongst the shoals of democracy."

It is worth remarking, in confirmation of these views, that from the beginning the most respectable branches of our government, presenting in their annals a high average of ability and virtue, and some of the most illustrious names that adorn our history, are the Senate and the judiciary, the chosen of the chosen; whilst almost every name that disgraces it is to be found on the list of our Presidents and the members of the lower house of Congress, both elected directly by the people.

In the cases where power is intrusted by the Constitution to the chosen of the chosen, the choosers are persons pre-appointed by the law, who therefore are known to the public, and perform legal duties subject to legal responsibility. The candidates selected by nominating conventions are the chosen of the chosen; but who are the choosers? Voluntary associations of obscure men, wielding great power, without legal duty or responsibility. Though nominally elected by the people, they are really appointed, as we have shown, by the managers of a party,—another voluntary association of obscure and often corrupt men, wielding great power, and, like the former, unknown to the law. The object of both is party success, and to gain it they are very unscrupulous as to the means employed to secure votes. Concessions are made to the lowest of the populace, even to the criminal classes, and candidates of their own order, and favored by them, are nominated for the sake of their support. Once nominated, they receive the votes of the party, even of the best men in it, who as a rule know nothing whatever about them, not even their names, which

they put, without reading the list, into the ballot-box, intending thereby, not a choice of candidate, but a support of the principles and policy of a party. Persons of infamous character are thus often unconsciously voted for by the most respectable men in the community, and sometimes consciously though reluctantly, because otherwise they could not vote at all, except for the opposite party, whose principles they do not approve, and whose men are as bad or worse.

It is obvious that the point of this machinery to which a remedy, if there be any, must be applied is the nominating convention. The party managers are a necessity which can neither be got rid of nor controlled, and whose influence for good or for evil depends on the character of the constituency of the party. Neither can they be prevented from controlling the primary meetings who elect the nominating conventions. But why may not the law control the nominating conventions, since they have become an overshadowing power in the state? Why not recognize their existence, and the necessity for it? Why not invest them with legal power, and thus with responsibility? This would be in accordance with the analogy of the Constitution. The legislatures of the States who choose Senators in Congress are legal assemblies, known to the people, elected publicly according to law, deliberating publicly, and meeting publicly at a decent place, not in secret at a low tavern in Equality Alley. Upon them the duty of choosing Senators is imposed by law, and for the due performance of it they are legally and morally responsible. The national judges are appointed in a similar way, and so the Constitution intended that the President should be chosen. The nominating convention is a more important institution for this purpose than either, for it chooses the President and the lower house of Congress, and the executive, legislative, and judiciary departments of all the State governments, all officers and legislatures of municipal governments, and a countless number of subordinate officers elected by the people. Yet it is a power unknown to the law, and untrammelled by any civil authority; its members and their doings are almost unknown to the people; and for its performances and their results, it is not responsible to any one, legally or morally.

But it may be said, What can the government do with such an institution, more especially if it be necessarily under the commanding influence of another which the law cannot control? The answer is, that by giving the former a legal existence, it may impose upon it such checks and responsibilities as may at least greatly diminish the evils it now inflicts upon the country, perhaps render its normal action safe and beneficial; for if the nominating conventions could be made to represent the enlightened opinion and sober sentiment of the people, they would be safe and useful. If they were composed of men superior in education and position to the mass of the people, they would at least refuse to offer as candidates to the people persons wholly unworthy to exercise political power.

For this purpose we venture to suggest some such plan as this.

Let the law provide for the election, at stated periods, of boards of nominors, whose duty it shall be to receive and consider all applications for offices whose incumbents are chosen by the popular vote, and from them let it select a number of candidates to be presented to the people for their suffrages.

Let it be provided that none other than those so selected shall become candidates, and let the members of the board be sworn to the performance of this duty without fear, favor, or affection, and let adequate penalties be provided to prevent bribery or fraud. This would be merely to enforce by law the duties which these conventions now profess to perform without law.

The chief difficulty would be to annex to the office of nominor such qualifications as might raise those who filled it above dishonest motives, and secure in them identity of interest with all classes of the community, and at the same time sufficient education, that they might truly represent the enlightened opinion of the country. If these qualifications be fixed too high, the plan would be rejected, if too low, many of the present abuses would continue. In determining, therefore, what these qualifications should be, a compromise must be made between what is desirable and what is practicable. Among them are those which are indicated by race, nationality, age, education, and

property. Considering therefore the vast power connected with the office, we should say that to secure the best results, every person who held it should be a native-born American citizen of the white race, not less than forty years of age, educated according to a standard to be fixed by law, and possessed of an amount of income or property sufficient to elevate him above the class working for wages ; and further, that during his term he should not hold any office under the national, State, or municipal government, nor for one year after the expiration of his term of service.

It is very true that nominating conventions are often composed of persons who satisfy all these conditions, but the majority of them as now constituted do not. It is true that a wide scope would still be left to partisan intrigue and corruption, but nevertheless some evil influences would be excluded. It is true that such conventions, however constituted, must still be greatly influenced by party managers ; but the good character of the conventions would resist the lowest and basest sort of influence, and invite the highest, and thus tend to raise the tone of party politics to a higher level. Voters conscious of their inability to inquire into the merits of candidates, if the choice were confided to a body of men expressly selected for the duty and competent to perform it, could vote without misgiving or disgust for the party whose principles they approved. And honorable and cultivated men, ambitious of a public career, could present themselves without loss of self-respect to a legal and intelligent tribunal able to appreciate and willing fairly to consider their claims.

The plan we have ventured to suggest is, of course, a mere outline. Should it, or one like it, ever come to be applied in practice, many matters of detail must be added. If the principles on which it is founded be correct, these could easily be furnished by persons versed in the working of party politics.

Perhaps by some such scheme as this, aided by the plans for voting so as to secure representation to minorities already referred to, the intelligence of our people may be able to disarm universal suffrage of its admitted evils and risks, and at the same time preserve whatever of good it possesses. This is its

tendency to increase the self-respect of the lower classes, and to educate them by active participation in public affairs ; to prevent the odious and invidious distinctions which create and embitter the animosities of caste ; and to diminish the temptation to disaffection, tumult, and disorder.

We have said above that the ignorant many, when possessed of political power, must choose from the enlightened few the persons to intrust with its administration, or must lose their power. It is very easy for such a government to be thus destroyed, for power will not long remain in the hands of ignorance, and the enlightened, with or without votes, are natural rulers. The object of the plan we have ventured to suggest is to secure obedience to this principle by law.

SIDNEY G. FISHER.

ART. IX. — GOVERNOR ANDREW.

JOHN ALBION ANDREW, late Governor of Massachusetts, was born May 31, 1818, at Windham, a small town near Lake Sebago, about fifteen miles from Portland,—two years before the separation of Maine from Massachusetts. The family was English in origin, descending in America from Robert Andrew, who immigrated to Rowley Village, now Boxford, in Essex County, Mass., and died there in 1668. It was connected by marriage with several of the famous ancient families of the Colony,—a grandmother of the Governor being a granddaughter of the brave Captain William Pickering, who commanded the Province Galley in 1707, to protect the fisheries against the French and Indians, and the mother of her husband being Mary Higginson, a direct descendant from Francis Higginson, the organizer of the first church in the Colony. A portrait of this old clergyman, his ancestor, depicted with snow-white hair and gray mustache, clad in a black robe, holding a book in one hand, on the index finger of which a large signet-ring is displayed, hung over the mantel